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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of locating multiple diffusion sources in networks with partial ob-
servations. We propose a new source localization algorithm, named Optimal-Jordan-Cover (OJC). The
algorithm first extracts a subgraph using a candidate selection algorithm that selects source candidates
based on the number of observed infected nodes in their neighborhoods. Then, in the extracted subgraph,
OJC finds a set of nodes that “cover” all observed infected nodes with the minimum radius. The set of
nodes is called the Jordan cover, and is regarded as the set of diffusion sources. Considering the heteroge-
neous susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) diffusion in the Erdo˝s-Rényi (ER) random graph, we prove
that OJC can locate all sources with probability one asymptotically with partial observations. OJC is a
polynomial-time algorithm in terms of network size. However, the computational complexity increases
exponentially in m, the number of sources. We further propose a low-complexity heuristic based on the
K-Means for approximating the Jordan cover, named Approximate-Jordan-Cover (AJC). Simulations on
random graphs and real networks demonstrate that both AJC and OJC significantly outperform other
heuristic algorithms.
1 Introduction
Diffusion source localization (or called the information source detection) is to infer the source(s) of an
epidemic diffusion process in a network based on some observations of the diffusion. Possible observed
information includes node states (e.g., infected or susceptible) and the timestamps at which nodes changed
their states. The solution to this problem has a wide range of applications. In epidemiology, identifying
patient zero helps diagnose the cause and the origin of the disease. For cybersecurity, tracing the source
of malware is an important step in the investigation of a cyber attack. On online social networks, the
trustworthiness of news/information heavily depends on its source.
Since the seminal work of Shah and Zaman [15], the problem has received a lot of attention from
different research communities, including machine learning, signal processing and information theory (a
detailed discussion can be found in the related work). However, most existing results assume that the
diffusion is from single source and the observed information is one or multiple complete network snapshot(s).
Furthermore, provably guarantees on the detection rate have only been established for tree networks except
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a recent paper by Zhu and Ying [24], where they proposed a Short-Fat Tree (SFT) algorithm and proved that
under the single-source, homogeneous Independent-Cascade (IC) model, SFT locates the actual source in
the Erdo˝s-Rényi random graph [4] with probability one asymptotically (as the size of the network increases)
when a complete snapshot of the network is given.
In this paper, we consider the diffusion source localization problem in a setting that generalizes the
existing ones at several important directions.
• Multiple sources versus single source: In this paper, the diffusion can be originated from multiple
nodes simultaneously, instead of from a single source. When the infection duration is sufficiently
short, the infected subnetworks from different sources are disconnected components. In such cases,
the single-source localization algorithms can be applied to each of the infected subnetwork. We,
however, do not make such an assumption, and consider the scenario where the infected subnetworks
may overlap with each other, so the single-source localization algorithms cannot be directly applied.
• A partial snapshot versus a complete snapshot: In this paper, we assume a partial snapshot in which
each node reports its state with some probability, which is in contrast to a complete snapshot assumed
in the literature where all nodes’ states are observed. Because of a partial snapshot, the sources may
not report their states and be observed as infected nodes; and the observed infected nodes may not
form a connected component. Both increase the uncertainty and complexity of the problem. In fact,
it turns out to be critical to have a candidate selection algorithm to select source candidates from
unobserved nodes but only use observed infected nodes in computing the infection eccentricity. The
selection step yields 27× reduction on the computing time in our simulations while guaranteeing the
same the detection rate, and yields 600× reduction on the computing time with a slight reduction of
the detection rate.
• Heterogeneous diffusion versus homogeneous diffusion: Our algorithm applies to the heterogeneous
SIR diffusion model where links have different infection probabilities and nodes have different recov-
ery probabilities. The asymptotic guarantees on the detection rate hold for the heterogeneous SIR
model.
While some of these extensions have been investigated in the literature individually, our model includes
all three extensions. We propose a novel algorithm for locating multiple sources for such a general model
and prove theoretical guarantees on the detection rate for non-tree networks. The main results of the paper
are summarized below.
(1) We introduce the concept of Jordan cover, which is an extension of Jordan center. Loosely speaking,
a Jordan cover with size m is a set of m nodes that can reach all observed infected nodes with the
minimum hop-distance. We propose Optimal-Jordan-Cover (OJC), which consists of two steps: OJC
first selects a subset of nodes as the set of the candidates of the diffusion sources; and then it finds
a Jordan cover in the subgraph induced by the candidate nodes and the observed infected nodes. We
emphasize that only the hop-distance to the observed infected nodes is considered in computing a
Jordan cover.
(2) We analyze the performance of OJC on the ER random graph, and establish the following performance
guarantees.
(i) When the infection duration is shorter than 23 lognµ , where µ is the average node degree and n is
the number of nodes in the network, OJC identifies the sources with probability one asymptoti-
cally as n increases.
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(ii) When the infection duration is at least
⌈
logn
log µ+log q
⌉
+ 2 where q is the minimum infection prob-
ability, under any source location algorithm, the detection rate diminishes to zero as n increases
under the Susceptible-Infected (SI) and Independent-Cascade (IC) models, which are special
cases of the SIR model.
(3) The computational complexity of OJC is polynomial in n, but exponential in m. We further propose
a heuristic based on the K-Means for approximating the Jordan cover, named Approximate-Jordan-
Cover (AJC). Assuming a constant number of iterations when using the K-Means, the computational
complexity of AJC isO(nE),where E is the number of edges. Our simulations on random graphs and
real networks demonstrate that both AJC and OJC significantly outperform other heuristic algorithms.
1.1 Related Work
Shah and Zaman [15, 16] studied the rumor source detection problem, and proposed a new graph centrality
called rumor centrality. They proved that the node with the maximum rumor centrality is the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE) of the diffusion source on regular trees under the continuous-time SI model. In
addition, it has been proved that the detection probability is greater than zero on regular trees and approaches
one for geometric trees. [17] analyzed the detection probability of rumor centrality for general random trees.
Later, the performance of rumor centrality has been studied under different models, including multiple
sources [11], incomplete observations [8], multiple independent diffusion processes from the same source
[18].
Kai and Ying [21] proposed a sample path based approach for single source detection under the SIR
model and introduced the concept of Jordan infection center. Assuming the homogeneous SIR model, a
complete network snapshot and regular tree networks, they [21] proved that the Jordan infection center is
the root of the most likely diffusion sample path, and it is within a constant hop-distance from the actual
source with a high probability. Assuming tree networks, the performance of the Jordan infection center
has been further studied, including partial observations under the heterogeneous SIR model [22], multiple
sources [3], the SI model and SIS model [12].
Besides the rumor centrality and sample path based approach, diffusion source localization has also been
investigated from other perspectives: 1) [9] proposed a dynamical programming algorithm for the IC model;
2) A variation of eigen centrality was proposed in [14] to detect multiple sources under the SI model; 3) [10]
derived the mean field approximation of the MLE of the actual source and proposed a dynamic message
passing algorithm based on that. Furthermore, [13, 25, 1, 20, 5] have proposed algorithms to identify the
source with partial timestamps.
In this paper, we propose two new source localization algorithms, OJC and AJC, based on the Jordan
cover. OJC guarantees probability one detection asymptotically on the ER random graph under the multi-
source, heterogeneous SIR model, and with an incomplete snapshot, which is the first multi-source localiza-
tion algorithm with provable guarantees for non-tree networks. AJC is a low-complexity approximation of
OJC.
2 Problem Formulation
We assume the network is represented by an undirected graph g. Denote by E(g) the set of edges and V(g)
the set of nodes in graph g. Let n denote the number of nodes and E denote the number of edges. We
further assume a heterogeneous SIR model for diffusion. In this model, each node has three possible states:
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susceptible (S), infected (I) and recovered (R). Time is slotted. At the beginning of each time slot, each
infected node (say node u) attempts to infect its neighbor (say node v) with probability quv, independently
across edges. We call quv the infection probability of edge (u, v). At the end of each time slot, each
infected node (say node u) recovers with probability ru, independent of other infected nodes. We call ru
the recovery probability. We further assume quv ∈ (0, 1] for all edges (u, v) ∈ E(g) and rv ∈ [0, 1] for all
nodes v ∈ V(g).
Note that the SIR model includes two important special cases. When the recovery probability is zero, the
SIR model becomes the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model [2], where infected nodes cannot recover. When the
recovery probability is one, the SIR model becomes the Independent Cascade (IC) model [6] by regarding
both infected nodes and recovered nodes as active nodes and regarding the susceptible nodes as inactive
nodes.
We assume the epidemic diffusion starts from m sources in the network. In other words, at time slot
0, m nodes (sources) are in the infected state and all other nodes are in the susceptible state. Denote by
s1, s2, · · · , sm the sources and S the set of sources, i.e., S = {s1, s2, · · · , sm}. We assume m is a constant
independent of n.
Finally, we assume that a partial snapshot of the network state at time slot t is given, with an unknown
observation time t. In the snapshot, each infected or recovered node reports its state with probability θv ∈
(0, 1), independent of other nodes. If a node reports its state, we call it an observed node. Denote by I ′ the
set of observed infected and recovered nodes. In this paper, we call infected nodes and recovered nodes as
“infected nodes” unless explicitly clarified.
Based on I ′, the source localization problem is to find S that solves the following maximum likelihood
(ML) problem
W∗ = argmax
W⊂V(g)
Pr(S =W|I ′).
Even with a single diffusion source, this problem is known to be a difficult problem [15, 21] on non-tree net-
works. Therefore, instead of solving the ML problem above, we are interested in algorithms with asymptotic
perfect detection, i.e., finding all sources with probability one as the network size increases. We believe this
alternative metric is reasonable because we often need to solve the problem for large-size networks such as
online social networks, and an algorithm with asymptotic perfect detection can detect sources with a high
probability when the network size is large.
3 Algorithms
In this section, we present OJC and AJC based on the concept of Jordan cover.
Define the hop-distance between a node v and a node set W to be the minimum hop-distance between
node v and any node in W, i.e.,
d(v,W) , min
u∈W
d(v, u).
We then define the infection eccentricity of node set W to be the maximum hop-distance from an infected
node in I ′ to set W, i.e.,
e(W,I ′) = max
v∈I′
d(v,W). (1)
We further define m-Jordan-cover (m-JC) to be the set W∗(K,I ′,m) such that
W∗(K,I ′,m) = argmin
W∈{W||W|=m,W⊂K}
e(W,I ′). (2)
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Algorithm 1: The Candidate Selection Algorithm
Input: I ′, g, Y ;
Output: g− (the candidate subgraph)
Set K to be an empty set.
for v ∈ V(g) do
if |N (v) ∩ I ′| >= Y then
Add v to K, where N (v) is the set of neighbors of node v.
end
end
Set K+ to be K ∪ I ′.
Set g′ to be the graph induced by set K+.
Find all connected components in g′.
if g′ is connected then
Set g− = g′.
else
Randomly select one node in each components of g′. Denote by R the set of the selected nodes.
Randomly select one node v ∈ R.
for u ∈ R\v do
Compute the shortest path P from v to u.
Set g′ = g′ ∪ P.
end
Set g− = g′
end
return g−,K.
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where I ′ is the set of observed infected nodes that m−JC needs to cover and K is the candidate set for the
sources. Therefore, m-JC is the set of m nodes in K with the minimum infection eccentricity.
We now introduce the optimal Jordan cover (OJC) algorithm whose asymptotic detection rate will be
analyzed in Section 4.1.
The Optimal Jordan Cover (OJC) Algorithm
• Step 1: Candidate Selection: Let Y be a positive integer. The candidate set K is the set of nodes
with more than Y observed infected neighbors. In addition, define K+ , K ∪ I ′. Denote by g− a
connected subgraph of g induced by node set K+. An induced graph is a subset of nodes of a graph
with all edges whose endpoints are both in the node subset. If the induced graph is not connected,
we select a random node in each component, randomly pick one selected node and add the shortest
pathes from this node to all other selected nodes to form a connected g−. We call Y the selection
threshold. The pseudo code of the candidate selection algorithm for selecting K and g− can be found
in Algorithm 1.
• Step 2: Jordan Cover: For any m combination of nodes in K in Step 1, we compute the infection
eccentricity of the node set as defined in (1) on subgraph g−, and select the combination with the
minimum infection eccentricity as the set of sources. Ties are broken by the total distance from the
observed infected to the node set, i.e.,
∑
v∈I′ d(v,W).
With a properly chosen threshold Y, the candidate selection step includes all sources in K with a high
probability and excludes nodes that are more than t + 1 hops away from all sources. By limiting the
computation on the induced subgraph g−, the computational complexity is reduced significantly. From
simulations, we will see that it results in 27× reduction of the running time without affecting the detection
rate. The asymptotic detection rate of OJC will be studied in Theorem 2. Under some conditions, OJC
identifies all sources with probability one asymptotically.
OJC is a polynomial-time algorithm for given m, but the complexity increases exponentially in m. To
further reduce the complexity, we propose Approximate Jordan Cover (AJC), which replaces Step 2 of OJC
with the K-Means algorithm [7]. As shown in the simulations, the performance of the AJC algorithm, in
terms of both detection rate and the error distance, is close to OJC with much shorter running time. The
computational complexity of both algorithms are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The computational complexity of OJC is
O
(
|I ′|
(
|E(g)| +m
(|V(g−)|
m
)))
,
and the computational complexity of AJC is
O
(|I ′| (|E(g)| +H|V(g−)|)) ,
where H is the number of iterations used in the K-Means algorithm in AJC.
Proof. We first analyze the complexity of the OJC algorithm. For simplicity, denote by V = |V(g)| the
number of nodes and E = |E(g)| the number of edges.
In the candidate selection stage, each node needs to compute its degree. Therefore, each edge is counted
twice and each node is processed once. The complexity is O(V +E). Counting the number of the connected
components using breadth first search is of complexity O(V +E). When the induced graph is not connected,
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the complexity to compute the shortest paths from one node to all other nodes in an unweighted graph is of
complexity O(V + E). As a summary, the complexity of the candidate selection algorithm is O(V + E).
The resulting subgraph has |V(g−)| nodes and at most E edges. Next, we compute the complexity of
the OJC.
We first compute the distances from nodes in g− to nodes in I ′. Note this is equivalent to do a breadth-
first search from each node in I ′. The complexity of the BFS is O(|V(g−)|+E). Therefore, the complexity
for this step is O(|I ′|(|V(g−)|+ E)). The results are saved in a two dimensions hashtable so that querying
the distance from one observed infected node and another node in graph g− is of complexity O(1).
After the above precomputation, for each set of nodes with size m, we want to obtain its infection
eccentricity. For each observed infected node, we query the hash table to find the minimum distance to
the set of nodes with size m. The complexity is O(m). To compute the infection eccentricity of one set is
of complexity O(m|I ′|). In addition, there are (|V(g−)|m ) possible node sets. Therefore, the complexity is
O((m|I ′|)(|V(g−)|m ))
As a summary, the complexity of the OJC algorithm is
O
(
V + E + |I ′|(|V(g−)|+ E) +m|I ′|
(|V(g−)|
m
))
=O
(
|I ′|
(
E +m
(|V(g−)|
m
)))
Next, we analyze the complexity of the AJC algorithm. Note the complexity of the candidate selection
and the precomputation are the same. The complexity of the Kmeans algorithm is analyzed as follows.
The complexity of the membership assignment phase is O(m|I ′|). For each observed infected node, we
only need to query its distance to the preselected m sources and each query is of complexity O(1) based on
the results of the precomputation.
For the center update phase, for each cluster, we need to search all |V(g−)| nodes to find a center.
Therefore, the complexity is |V(g−)||I ′|.
As a summary, the complexity of one iteration of the Kmeans algorithm is
O
((
m+ |V(g−)|) |I ′|)
Denote by H the number of iterations, the complexity of the AJC algorithm is
O
(
V + E + |I ′|(|V(g−)|+ E) +N ((m+ |V(g−)|) |I ′|))
=O
(|I ′| (E +H|V(g−)|))
4 Asymptotic Analysis of OJC
In this section, we present the asymptotic analysis of the detection rate of OJC on the ER random graph.
The results include the conditions that guarantee probability one detection and the conditions under which
it is impossible to detect the source set with nonzero probability under any source localization algorithm.
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4.1 Asymptotic perfect detection on the ER random graph
We first present the positive result that shows that on the ER random graph, OJC identifies the m sources
with probability one asymptotically under some conditions. Recall that n is the number of nodes in the graph,
and m is the number of sources, which is a constant independent of n. Denote by p the wiring probability
of the ER random graph, which is the probability that there exists a link between two nodes. Let µ = np,
which is the average node degree. Define q , minu,v∈V(g) qu,v, i.e., the minimum infection probability over
all edges and θ , minv∈V(g) θv i.e., the minimum report probability over all nodes.
Theorem 2. OJC identifies all m sources with probability one as n → ∞ when the following conditions
hold:
(c1): µqθ = Ω(log n) ,1
(c2): lim supn→∞ Yµqθ < 1 and lim infn→∞ Yµqθ > 0, and
(c3): t = ω(D) and lim supn→∞ tlog n
log µ
< 23 .
Proof. In this proof, we will show that one source si ∈ W∗(K,I ′,m) with a high probability. Then with a
union bound, we will show that
S =W∗(K,I ′,m).
with a high probability for sufficiently large n.
Recall that we regard the recovered nodes and infected nodes as "infected" since the recovery process is
not related to the proof. Without loss of generality, we consider s1. Throughout the proof, we consider the
BFS tree rooted at s1. In particular, the level of one node means the level of the node on the BFS tree rooted
at s1.
We first introduce and recall some necessary notations terms.
For an ER random graph g.
• A node v is said to be on level i if ds1v = i. Denote by Li the set of nodes from level 0 to level i and
li = |Li|.
• Denote by L′i the set of nodes on level i. In addition, l′i is the number of nodes on level i.
• The descendants of node v in a tree are all the nodes in the subtree rooted at v. In addition, v is the
ancestor of all its descendants.
• The offsprings of a node on level k (say v) are the nodes which are on level k + 1 and have edges to
v. Denote by Φ(v) the offspring set of v and φ(v) = |Φ(v)|.
• Denote by p the wiring probability in the ER random graph.
• Denote by n the total number of nodes.
• Denote by µ = np.
• Denote by Bi(n, p) the binomial distribution with n number of trials and each trial succeeds with
probability p.
1Throughput this paper, the asymptotic order notation is defined for n → ∞.
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• Denote by T † the BFS tree rooted at s1.
• Denote by Φ′(v) the set of offsprings of node v on T † and φ′(v) = |Φ′(v)|.
• Denote by gt the subgraph induced by all nodes within t hops from s on the ER graph. The collision
edges are the edges which are not in T † but in gt, i.e., e ∈ E(gt)\E(T †).
• A node who is an end node of a collision edge is called a collision node. Denote by Rk the set of
collision edges whose end nodes are within level k and Rk = |Rk|.
• Denote by Zi the set of nodes which are infected at time i.
• Denote by Z˜ij(v) the set of nodes that are infected at time slot i, on level j, when s1 is the only
infection source in the graph and the descendants of node v in the BFS tree rooted at s1 and Z˜ ′ij (v)
are the observed infected nodes in Z˜ij(v). Z˜ij(v) and Z˜ ′ij (v) are defined as the cardinality respectively.
• Denote by ψ(v) the number of observed infected neighbors of node v.
• Denote by ψ′(v) the number of infected offsprings of node v (the offspring is defined based on the
BFS tree rooted at node s1).
• Denote by ψ′′(v) the number of observed infected offsprings of node v.
To prove s1 ∈ W∗(K,I ′,m), we need to show that any set W such that s1 6∈ W has a infection
eccentricity larger than t on g−. We need the following asymptotic high probability events.
• Offsprings of each node. Consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1. Define
E1 = {∀v ∈ Lt+D, φ′(v) ∈ ((1− δ)µ, (1 + δ)µ)}.
E1, when occurs, provides upper and lower bounds for the number of offsprings of each node in
Lt+D.
• Total number collision edges. Consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1. We define event E2 when
the following upper bound on the collision edges holds
Rj


= 0 if 0 < j ≤ ⌊m−⌋,
≤ 8µ if ⌊m−⌋ < j < ⌈m+⌉,
≤ 4[(1+δ)µ]2j+1n if ⌈m+⌉ ≤ j ≤ logn(1+α) log µ .
where m+ = logn2 log[(1+δ)µ] and m
− = logn−2 log µ−log 82 log[(1+δ)µ] . E2 provides the upper bounds for collision
edges at different levels. Note that a subgraph with diameter ≤ m− is a tree with high probability
since there is no collision edges.
• Detailed collision edges in level > D + t. Define E3 to be the event that
∀v ∈ L′D+t+1, ψ(v) < (1− δ)3µqθ.
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Figure 1: A pictorial example for Theorem 2.
• Infected nodes. Define
E4 = {∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq.}
and
E5 = {∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′′(v) > (1− δ)3µqθ.}
• Infected nodes from source s1. Define
E6 = {Z˜11 ≥ (1− δ)2µq} ∩ {∀v ∈ Z˜11 , Z˜ ′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ}
To prove these event happens with a high probability, we have
Pr(E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ∩ E4 ∩ E5 ∩ E6)
≥Pr(E1)(1− Pr(E¯2|E1)− Pr(E¯3|E1)− Pr(E¯6|E1))− Pr(E¯4 ∪ E¯5)
=Pr(E1)(1− Pr(E¯2|E1)− Pr(E¯3|E1)− Pr(E¯6|E1))− (1− Pr(E4 ∩ E5))
≥1− ǫ,
for sufficiently large n. Based on Lemma 1, 2, 4 and 5, we have events E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6 happen with
a high probability as n is large enough. The proofs can be found in the Appendices.
We summarize the important properties of the OJC algorithm based on the above asymptotic events.
(a) Let Y = (1 − δ)3µqθ. In Step 1 of the OJC algorithm, we have K ⊂ Lt+D, i.e., all nodes on the
subgraph g− are within level t+D of the BFS tree rooted at source s1. Based on E3, all nodes on level
t+D+1 have less than Y observed infected neighbors. In addition, all nodes one level l > t+D+1
have no infected neighbors since all the infected nodes are within level t+D.
(b) Based on event E5, all nodes which are infected at or before time t − 1 have at least Y observed
infected neighbors. Therefore, we have ∪t−1i=0Zi ⊂ K which implies I ⊂ K+ and g− is a connected
graph.
Therefore, g− is a connected graph which contains all the infected nodes and is restricted up to level t+D
based on E3 and E5.
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Next we will show that s1 ∈ W∗ by contradiction. Note, we have e(S,I ′) = t. Therefore, e(W∗,I ′) ≤
t. We will show that e(W,I ′) > t for any set of nodes W where |W| = m, s1 6∈ W. Note, all the
infection eccentricity are considered based on the subgraph g−. Specifically, we will show that no nodes
in g− other than source s1 can reach all nodes which are infected by source s1 within t time slot based on
events E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 and E6.
Consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1. We discuss the proof in two cases.
(a) When t +D ≤ ⌊m−⌋, according to the event E2, the t + D hops from s1 is a tree because there is
not collision edges. When event E6 occur, there are at least (1 − δ)2µq infected nodes at level 1 and
∀v ∈ Z11 , Z ′′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ which means there exists at least one observed infected
node on level t for each subtree rooted at level 1. Consider a set W where s1 6∈ W . There exists a
node u ∈ Z˜11 such that W ∩V(T−s1u ) 6= ∅ where T−s1u is the tree rooted at node u without the branch
of node s1 (the subtree on level 1). Therefore, for one node w ∈ Z˜ ′tt (u), we have d(w,W) > t. Hence
for any set W with size m that does not contain s1, e(W,I ′) > t. Therefore, we have s1 ∈ W∗ when
t+D ≤ ⌊m−⌋.
Figure 1 shows a pictorial example when m = 3. The red nodes are the nodes in set W. The existence
of node u is guaranteed since m nodes are insufficient to cover all level 1 branches of the BFS tree
rooted in s1. The red areas are the t hop neighborhood of nodes w1, w2 and w3. In this case, the t+D
neighborhood of node s1 is a tree. Therefore, any set W does not contain s1 can not reach the yellow
area Z˜ ′′tt (u) within t hops as shown in the figure.
(b) Consider the case when t+D > ⌊m−⌋. Again, based on event E6, there exists a node u ∈ Z˜11 such
that W ∩ V(T−s1u ) 6= ∅. The distance between a node in Z ′tt (u) and set W on the BFS tree is larger
than t. Therefore, if W is a Jordan infection cover, the shortest paths between Z ′tt (u) and set W must
contain at least one collision nodes. In the rest of the proof, we will show that the number of collision
nodes is insufficient to provides the “shortcuts” to all observed infected nodes.
Define H to be the total number of nodes each of which has the shortest path to W within t hops and
containing at least one collision node. If H < Z˜ ′tt (u), there exists a node w ∈ Ztt (u) such that d(w,W) > t.
Therefore, W can not be the Jordan infection cover and the theorem is proved.
In the rest of the proof, we will show that H < Z˜ ′tt (u). We first have the lower bound on Z˜ ′tt (u)
according to E6,
Z˜ ′tt (u) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ (3)
For each node wi in W, define Hi to be the total number of nodes each of which has the shortest path to wi
within t hops and containing at least one collision node. The upper bound of Hi can be obtained based on
Lemma 6 in [23].
Hi ≤ c[(1 + δ)µ] 34 (t+D)+ 12 + c[(1 + δ)µ]( 54−α2 )(t+D)+2,
and we have
H ≤
m∑
i=2
Hi ≤ mc[(1 + δ)µ] 34 (t+D)+ 12 +mc[(1 + δ)µ]( 54−α2 )(t+D)+2,
Since 12 < α < 1, we have α =
1
2 + α
′ where 0 < α′ < 12 is a constant, we have
H
Z˜ ′tt (u)
≤ mc[(1 + δ)µ]
3
4
(t+D)+ 1
2
[(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ +
mc[(1 + δ)µ](
5
4
−α
2
)(t+D)+2
[(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ (4)
11
=
mc
µ
(
(1 + δ)
3
4
+( 3D4 +
1
2)
1
t
[(1− δ)2q]1− 1t (1− δ)θµ 14−( 3D4 + 52) 1t
)t
(5)
+
mc
µ

 (1 + δ)1−α
′
2
+
[(
1−α
′
2
)
D+2
]
1
t
[(1 − δ)2q]1− 1t (1− δ)θµ
α′
2
−
(
4+
(
1−α
′
2
)
D
)
1
t


t
(6)
Since t >> D, we have
t ≥ min
{
3D + 2,
(
2
α′
− 1
)
D +
4
α′
,
(
4
α′
− 2
)
D +
16
α′
}
Therefore, Inequality (6) becomes
H
Z˜ ′tt (u)
≤ 2mc
µ
(
(1 + δ)
[(1 − δ)2q]µα′4
)t
.
Since µ > 1Cqθ log n and δ, q, α
′ are constants, we have
(1 + δ)
[(1− δ)2q]µα′4
< 1
when
n > exp
(
1
2
(
(1 + δ)
(1− δ)2q
) 4
α′
)
.
Therefore, we have
H
Z˜ ′tt (u)
≤ 2mc
µ
≤ ǫ′,
where ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant and the inequality holds for sufficiently large n. There are at least (1 −
ǫ′)Z˜ ′tt (u) nodes which cannot be reached from W with t hops on g−. Hence we have e(I ′,W) > t.
Therefore, we proved that s1 ∈ W∗ with a high probability when n is sufficiently large, i.e., we have
Pr(s1 ∈ W∗) ≥ 1− ǫ
m
since m is a constant. Then, by applying the union bound, we have, for sufficiently large n,
Pr(si ∈ W∗, ∀i = 1, · · · ,m) ≥ 1− ǫ
Note, we have |W∗| = m. Therefore, we have
Pr(S =W∗) ≥ 1− ǫ
Hence, the Jordan infection cover equals the actual source set with a high probability.
We now briefly explain the conditions. Recall that µ is the average node degree, q is the lower bound on
the infection probability and θ is the lower bound on the reporting probability, so µqθ is a lower bound on
the average number of observed infected neighbors of a node that was infected before time slot t. Therefore,
condition (c1) requires that this lower bound is Ω(log n), and condition (c2) requires that the threshold
used in the candidate selection algorithm is a constant fraction of the average number of observed infected
neighors. Applying the Chernoff bound, conditions (c1) and (c2) together yield the following conclusions:
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(i) any node who was infected before or at time slot t− 1 (hence, including the sources) will be selected
into the candidate set with a high probability,
(ii) any node that is t+D+1 hops away from the set of sources will not have Y or more observed infected
neighbors with a high probability, and
(iii) any node that is more than t +D + 1 hops away from the set of sources will not have any observed
infected neighbors.
Based the above facts, with a high probability, the candidate set includes all nodes who were infected at t−1
or earlier, and any node in g− is at most t+D hops away from all sources.
Condition (c3) is on the infection duration. We first restrict t = ω(D) so that the infection sub-
graphs starting from different sources are likely to overlap and form a connected component. This is
a more interesting regime than the one in which infection subgraphs are disconnected from each other.
lim supn→∞
t
logn
log µ
< 23 is a critical condition. The intuition why it is required is explained below. Figure
1 provides a pictorial explanation of the proof. The picture illustrates the breadth-first-search (BFS) tree
T † rooted at source s1 with height t + D, where s1 is one of the m sources. The nodes in orange are the
observed infected nodes whose infection was originated from s1. The blue nodes are unobserved nodes. A
node is said to be on level i of the BFS if its hop-distance to s1 is i. Assume m = 3 and consider a set of
three nodes who are within t + D hops from s1 but not includes s1 (e.g., W = {w1, w2, w3} in Figure 1).
Suppose the infection eccentricity of W is ≤ t. Since s1 has a sufficient number of neighbors according
to the definition of µ, with a high probability, there exists a subtree of T † starting from an offspring of s1,
which does not include any node in W . Assume u is the root of such a subtree in Figure 1. The yellow area
in Figure 1 includes the level-t observed infected nodes on subtree T−s1u . Any path from w1, w2 or w3 to
the yellow area, formed by edges on T †, must have hop-distance larger than t. Therefore, if the infection
eccentricity of W is at least t, there must exist a path from W to each of the nodes in the yellow area with
hop-distance ≤ t, and such a path must include at least one edge which is not in T † (we call these edges
collision edges). In the detailed analysis, we will prove that with a high probability, the number of nodes
within t hops from W via the collision edges is order-wise smaller than the number of nodes in the yellow
area when (c3) holds. Therefore, the Jordan cover has to include s1. The same argument applies to other
sources.
4.2 Impossibility results
Theorem 5 in [24] presents the conditions under which it is impossible to identify the single source under
the IC diffusion on the ER random graph, which is a special case of the model in this paper. Assuming SI
or IC model, based on Lemma 1 in [24], we have that with a high probability, all nodes of the ER graph
become infected when the infection duration is at least
tu ,
⌈
log n
log µ+ log q
⌉
+ 2.
When this occurs, it is impossible to detect the sources since the nodes are indifferentiable.
Theorem 3. Assume the multi-source diffusion follows the IC or SI model. If 24 log n < qµ << √n and q
is a constant independent of n, then
lim
n→∞
Pr(I = V(g)) = 1
when the observation time t ≥ tu. In other words, the entire network is infected after tu with a high
probability. In such a case, the probability of finding the sources diminishes to zero as n→∞.
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Figure 2: Performance of OJC with different threshold values on the ER random graph
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tion size: 300 ∼ 500.
Figure 3: The Performance of OJC, AJC, CC and DC on the ER random graph with different sample rates
and threshold values
5 Simulations
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our algorithms via simulations. The performance metrics
used in this paper include:
• Error distance: The error distance is defined to be
min
P∈permutation(S′)
m∑
i=1
d(si, pi)
m
,
where s1, s2, . . . , sm are the real sources, S ′ is the set of detected sources and P = (p1, p2, ..., pm) is
a permutation of S ′.
• Detection rate: The detection rate is defined as
|S ∩ S ′|
m
.
We compared our algorithms with two heuristic algorithms (DC and CC) based on K-Means, which have
been used for comparison in [12]. The algorithms proposed in [12] and [3] are the same as AJC without
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Figure 4: The Performance of OJC, AJC, CC and DC on the power grid network with different sample rates
and threshold values
candidate selection. In both DC and CC, the initial centroids are randomly chosen. During the clustering
step of each iteration in K-Means, we selected distance centroid of each cluster in DC and selected close-
ness centroid in CC, where distance centroid is defined as argminv∈C
∑
u∈C∩I′ d(v, u), where C is the set
of nodes in the cluster. Closeness centroid is defined as argmaxv∈C
∑
u∈C∩I′,u 6=v
1
d(u,v) . The following
experiments were conducted on an server with 8 Intel Xeon X3450 CPUs and 16G RAM with Linux 64 bit
system. All algorithms were implemented with Python 2.7.
5.1 OJC with different thresholds
In Figure 2, we evaluated OJC on the ER random graph. In the experiments, we generated an ER random
graph with 5, 000 nodes and wiring probability 0.002. We used the homogeneous SI model for diffusion
with infection probability 0.8. In this experiment, we limited the infection network size to be 100 ∼ 300 and
the number of sources to be 2 due to the computational complexity of the OJC algorithm. Figure 2 shows
the performance of OJC with different thresholds. From the results, the detection rate is close to one and the
error distance is close to zero under OJC with threshold 0 or 1. However, the running time is 1,817 seconds
versus 68 seconds. So the candidate selection algorithm with threshold one results in 27× reduction of the
running time. When the threshold increases 2, the running time reduces to 3 seconds, which is a 600×
reduction of the running time. Both the detection rate and the error distance became slightly worse in this
case. The detection rate in this case is 0.961 and the error distance is 0.056.
5.2 OJC, AJC and other heuristics
We further evaluated the performance of OJC and AJC on both the power grid network [19] and ER
random graph (size: 5000, wiring probability: 0.002) and compared them with DC and CC heuristics.
We used the homogeneous SI model with infection probability 0.8 to generate the diffusion sequences.
For AJC/CC/DC, for each diffusion sequence, we repeated the algorithm 100 times from different initial
conditions and chose the source set with the smallest the smallest-infection-eccentricity/largest-closeness-
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centrality/smallest-distance-centrality. In Figure 3 and 4, the x−axis represents the combinations of sample
rate and threshold. On the ER random graph, we increased the threshold as the sample rate increased to
control the running time. For the power-grid network, since the average node degree is only 2, we set thresh-
old equal to 2 for experiments for all sample rates. As we can see from the figures that when fixing the
threshold, the performance of all algorithms (in terms of both error distance and detection rate) improves
as the sample rate increases because we had more information about the diffusion. From Figure 3 and 4,
we can also see that AJC outperforms DC and CC, and has similar performance with OJC. Note that with
four sources, OJC became very slow on both the ER random graph and the power grid network because its
complexity increases exponentially in the number of sources. So for the cases with four sources, we only
simulated AJC.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the problem of detecting multiple diffusion sources under the heterogeneous SIR
model with incomplete observations. We defined a concept called Jordan cover and developed the OJC
algorithm based on that. Our theoretical analysis showed that OJC finds the set of sources in the ER random
graph with probability one asymptotically under mild conditions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first theoretic performance guarantee for multiple information sources detection in non-tree networks. Since
the computational complexity of OJC is polynomial in n but exponential in m, we proposed a heuristic
algorithm — the AJC algorithm. Our simulation results showed that OJC and AJC algorithms have similar
performance and both significantly outperform existing algorithms.
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Appendices
A Proof of E1 and E2
Lemma 1. Assume the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any ǫ > 0, we have
Pr(E1) ≥ 1− ǫ,
and
Pr(E2|E1) ≥ 1− ǫ,
for suffciently large n.
The proof follows directly from the proof of Lemma 3 and 4 in [23].
B Proof of E3
Lemma 2. Assume the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any ǫ > 0, we have
Pr(E3|E1) ≥ 1− ǫ,
for suffciently large n.
Proof. Since all sources are within D hops from s1 and the snapshot is taken at time t, all the infected
nodes are within t + D hops from s1. To prove the conclusion, we only need to show that any node on
level t +D + 1 does not have more than (1 − δ)3µqθ neighbors. Since all infected nodes are within level
t+D, instead of considering the observed infected neighbors, we only need to show that any node on level
t+D+1 does not have more than (1−δ)3µqθ neighbors in level t+D.Therefore, in this proof, we consider
a more restrictive event which is only a topological feature of the ER random and does not depend on the
infection process.
Based on E1, there are at most [(1 + δ)µ]t+D nodes in level t+D and at most [(1 + δ)µ]t+D+1 nodes
in level t+D + 1. For any node v in level t+D + 1, the neighbors of node v in t+D are either the node
which introduce node v into level t + D + 1 (i.e., the parent of v in the BFS tree) or the collision edges
between node v and nodes in level t+D. The total number of possible collision edges depends on the order
that the parent of node v is introduced to the BFS tree.
In general, if the parent of node v is the ith node, the number of possible neighbors on level t + D
follows Bi([(1 + δ)µ]D+t − i, µ/n) + 1. As a summary, for any node on level t + D + 1 the number of
neighbors in level t+D is stochastically upper bounded by Bi([(1 + δ)µ]D+t, µn) + 1. Define
X , (1− δ)3µqθ − 1.
Define δ′ to be
δ′ ,
Xn
[(1 + δ)µ]tµ
− 1.
Denote by Nv the number of neighbors in level t+D for one node v on level t+D + 1.
Pr(Nv ≥ X + 1|E1) ≤ exp
(
−δ
′2[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
2 + δ′
)
(7)
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= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
× δ′[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
)
(8)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
×
(
Xn
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ
− 1
)
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
)
(9)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
×
(
X
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ− [(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
))
(10)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
× (X − [(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n)) (11)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
× ((1− δ)3µqθ − 1− [(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n)) (12)
= exp
(
− δ
′µ
2 + δ′
(
(1− δ)3qθ − 1/µ − [(1 + δ)µ]t+D/n)) (13)
≤ exp
(
−δ
′(1− δ)3qθµ
2(2 + δ′)
)
(14)
≤ exp
(
−(1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
(15)
Since t+D < logn(1+α) log µ , we have
t+D ≤ log n
log µ
×
1− log µlogn
1 + log(1+δ)log µ
. (16)
Hence,
[(1 + δ)µ]t+D
n
≤ 1
µ
(17)
Hence, Inequality (14) is based on Inequality (17) and Inequality (15) is based on δ′ ≥ 1 for sufficiently
large n. For any node in level t+D + 1, we have
Pr (∩vNv < X + 1|E1)
=1− Pr (∪vNv ≥ X + 1|E1)
≥1−
∑
v
Pr (Nv ≥ X + 1|E1)
≥1− [(1 + δ)µ]t+D+1 exp (−Ω(µ))
≥1− exp
(
(t+D + 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− (1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
Note we have t+D ≤ logn(1+α) logµ . Therefore,
Pr (∩vNv < X + 1|E1)
≥1− exp
(
((t+D) log[(1 + δ)] + (t+D) log µ+ log[(1 + δ)µ])− (1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
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≥1− exp
(
log n
(1 + α) log µ
log[(1 + δ)] +
log n
(1 + α)
+ log[(1 + δ)µ]− (1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
Let C ≤ 6
(1−δ)3(1+α)
and since µ > 1Cqθ log n, we have
Pr (∩vNv < X + 1) ≥ 1− exp (−Ω(µ))
for sufficiently large n. By substituting X, we proved the lemma.
C Proof of E4 and E5
C.1 Neighboring structure of all sources
To prove E4 and E5 happen with a high probability, we first analyze the neighborhood of all sources in the
ER random graph. In this section, we derived upper and lower bounds of the t neighborhood of all sources.
Define Lil the set of nodes from level 0 to level l of the BFS tree rooted in source si. In addition, define φ′i(v)
the number of offsprings of node v on the BFS tree rooted in source si. Define
Ei1 = {∀v ∈ Lit−1, φ′i(v) ∈ ((1− δ)µ, (1 + δ)µ)
Denote by the event
E˜ = ∩mi=2Ei1 ∩ E1.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any ǫ > 0,
Pr(E˜) ≥ 1− ǫ
for sufficiently large n.
Proof. For each infection source si, follow the similar argument of Lemma 3 in [23], we have
Pr(Ei1) ≥ exp
(
−8 exp
(
− δ
2µ
2 + δ
+ (t− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]
))
≥ 1− 8 (µ (1 + δ))
t−1
exp
(
δ2µ
2+δ
)
Hence, we have
Pr(E¯i1) ≤
8 (µ (1 + δ))t−1
exp
(
δ2µ
2+δ
)
Therefore, with an union bound, we have
Pr(∩mi=2Ei1) ≥ 1−
m∑
i=1
Pr(E¯i1)
≥ 1− 8(m− 1) (µ (1 + δ))
t−1
exp
(
δ2µ
2+δ
)
≥ 1− exp
(
log 8(m− 1) + (t− 1) log (µ(1 + δ)) − δ
2µ
2 + δ
)
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To make the probability larger than 1− ǫ, we have
t ≤
log ǫ8(m−1) +
δ2µ
2+δ
log(µ(1 + δ))
+ 1
Again, we have t+D < logn(1+α) log µ and µ >
1
Cqθ log n > 3 log n which guarantees the probability goes to 1
asymptotically.
Note the events ∩mi=2Ei1 do not contain the neighborhood of source s1. Based on Lemma 1, with a union
bound, it is straightforward to show that
Pr
(∩mi=2Ei1 ∩E1) > 1− ǫ.
for sufficiently large n. Hence the lemma is proved.
C.2 Proof of E4 and E5
Lemma 4. If the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any ǫ > 0,
Pr(E4, E5) ≥ 1− ǫ
for sufficiently large n.
Proof. We still consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1 and we can rewrite the events E4 and E5 in a
combined fashion
E4 ∩E5 = {∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ}.
Define
Fi = {Zi|∀v ∈ Zi, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ}
Then, we have
Pr(E4, E5)
≥Pr(E4, E5|E˜) Pr(E˜)
Pr(E4, E5|E˜)
=Pr(∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|E˜)
=
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−1∈Ft−1
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ
|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) Pr(Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
We have
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
22
≥1−
∑
v∈Zt−1
Pr(ψ′(v) ≤ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
Note conditioned on Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, consider an offspring u of node v on the BFS tree rooted at source
s1. Node u has two possible states: infected or susceptible. If u is not infected, v will infect node u with
probability q in the next time slot. On the other hand, if u is infected, it counts as an infected offspring of
node v deterministically. Therefore, ψ′(v) is stochastically lower bounded by binomial distribution B((1−
δ)µ, q). Therefore, with Chernoff bound in [23], we have
Pr(ψ′(v) ≤ (1− δ)2µq|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)µq
2
)
Each infected nodes are observed with probability θ independently. Conditioned on ψ′(v) ≥ (1 − δ)2µq,
ψ′′(v) is stochastically lower bounded by B((1− δ)2µq, θ). Therefore,
Pr(ψ′′(v) ≤ (1 − δ)3µqθ|ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq,Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
Therefore, we have
Pr(ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
=
(
1− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)µq
2
))(
1− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
≥1− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)µq
2
)
− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
≥1− 2 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
Again with union bound, we have
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1 − δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
≥1− 2|Zt−1| exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
Note, based on event E˜, we have
|Zt−1| ≤ m
t−1∑
i=0
[(1 + δ)µ]i ≤ 2m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1
Hence, we have
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1 − δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
≥1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
Therefore, we have
Pr(E4, E5|E˜)
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=
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−1∈Ft−1
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ
|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) Pr(Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
≥
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−1∈Ft−1
(
1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
×Pr(Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
=
(
1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
×
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−2∈Ft−2
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−2, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ
|Zt−2,Zt−3, · · · ,Z1, E˜) Pr(Zt−2,Zt−3, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
Then, iteratively apply the similar arguments, we obtain,
Pr(E4, E5|E˜) (18)
≥
t∏
i=2
(
1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]i−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(19)
=
t∏
i=2
(
1− exp
(
log 4m+ (i− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(20)
≥
t∏
i=2
exp
(
−2 exp
(
log 4m+ (i− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ] − δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(21)
=exp
(
−2
t∑
i=2
exp
(
log 4m+ (i− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(22)
=exp
(
−2 exp
(
log 4m− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
) t−1∑
i=1
exp (i log[(1 + δ)µ])
)
(23)
≥ exp
(
−4 exp
(
log 4m− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
+ (t− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]
))
(24)
To make the probability greater than 1− ǫ, we need,
t ≤ 1 + log log(1− ǫ)
−1/4 − log 2m+ δ2(1−δ)2µqθ2
log((1 + δ)µ)
(25)
Since we have t+D < logn(1+α) log µ and µ >
1
Cqθ log n >
2
δ2(1−δ)2qθ
log n, Inequality 25 is satisfied when n
is large enough.
Therefore, based on Lemma 3 and Inequality 24, we showed that
Pr(E4, E5) ≥ Pr(E4, E5|E˜) Pr(E˜) ≥ 1− ǫ
for any ǫ > 0 when n is sufficiently large.
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D Proof of E6
Lemma 5. If the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any ǫ > 0,
Pr(E6|E1) ≥ 1− ǫ
for sufficiently large n.
Proof. Define
E7 = {Z˜11 ≥ (1− δ)2µq} ∩ {∀v ∈ Z˜11 ,∩ti=2Z˜ii (v) ≥ (1− δ)2µqZ˜i−1i−1(v)}
Following the similar arguments in Lemma 5 in [23], we have
Pr(E7|E1) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Note, for each node v ∈ Z˜11 , based on event E7, we have Z˜tt(v) ≥ [(1 − δ)2µq]t−1. Recall each
infected node report its status independently. Therefore, Z˜ ′tt (v) is stochastically lower bounded by Bi([(1−
δ)2µq]t−1, θ). By Chernoff bound, we have
Pr(Z˜ ′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ|E7, E1) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2[(1− δ)2µq]t−1θ
2
)
Note Z˜11 ≤ (1 + δ)µ based on event E1, with a union bound, we have
Pr(∀v ∈ Z˜11 , Z˜ ′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ|E7, E1)
≥1− (1 + δ)µ exp
(
−δ
2[(1− δ)2µq]t−1θ
2
)
≥1− exp
(
log[(1 + δ)µ] − δ
2[(1− δ)2µq]t−1θ
2
)
≥1− ǫ,
for sufficiently large n since µ > 1Cqθ log n.
Therefore, we have
Pr(E6|E1) ≥ Pr(E6|E7, E1) Pr(E7|E1) ≥ 1− ǫ.
The lemma is proved.
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